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After 2011 the Syrian conflict caused growing numbers of residents to flee to escape 
escalating regime brutality and deteriorating economic conditions. In addition to a 
population of up to eight million internally displaced residents, at least four million Syrians 
fled to neighboring Arab states and Turkey. Conditions in those countries ranged from 
desperate to uncomfortable, and between 2014 and 2016 up to a million refugees continued 
on to seek asylum in Europe. In addition to the trauma of displacement the refugees 
experienced, the migration left traces on the host and transit countries in the form of 
economic and infrastructural challenges, xenophobia, and changing regulation of borders, 
asylum, and citizenship parameters. The dynamics of unsustainable precarity, closing 
borders, and increasingly hostile receptions in a range of countries encouraged Syrians to 
keep moving west. This movement put pressure on the asylum regime of the European Union 
as well as Balkan states and allowed the government of Turkey to use the refugees for 
political purposes. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Syrian conflict, which started in 2011, provoked a mass migration of refugees. During 
2011 and 2012, massive and widespread popular demonstrations for democratic reforms in 
the Baath-dominated Syrian Arab Republic spread from the southern region around Deraa 
and the central city of Homs to localities throughout the country, including parts of all major 
cities. The regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad responded to these demonstrations 
with the proverbial iron fist. Demonstrators, young men from rebel strongholds, and activists 
were rounded up and tortured in prison or slaughtered in their homes. By 2012, areas of most 
major cities in Syria were subject to house-to-house raids, the arbitrary detention of activists 
and other civilians, and eventually mortar and missile attacks from helicopter gunships.1 
Regime atrocities spiked in August 2013 with chemical weapons attacks on civilian areas in 
the suburbs of Damascus that killed about fourteen hundred civilians. When the international 
community failed to respond to this provocation, aerial attacks continued—though usually 
with ordinary munitions and “barrel bombs”—because high-profile weapons of mass 
destruction were now subject to international diplomatic negotiations. The massive and brutal 
response by the government to widespread calls for democratic reform dislodged much of the 
population of Syria. Between 2013 and 2018 the situation continued to deteriorate with Iran 
and Russia propping up the Syrian regime and allowing the decimation of the society to 
continue at a large scale. The degradation of the organized opposition to the regime into 
feuding and increasingly extremist rivals armed and funded by regional sponsors did little to 
improve the situation, while the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) gained and 
lost swathes of territory in eastern Syria at incalculable cost to residents.  
Before 2011, Syria had been the world’s second-largest host country for refugees. 
Palestinians who were exiled in 1948 and 1967 formed large communities inside Syria. 
During the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent war, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis  
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sought refuge in Syria.2 In addition, communities of Sudanese, Somalis, and Yemenis were to 
be found throughout the country. During the time of the First World War, Armenians fleeing 
genocide in the Ottoman Empire and Kurds fleeing persecution in the Turkish Republic had 
also made Syria their home. In contrast, by 2015, Syria was the world’s largest producer of 
refugees and one of the world’s largest populations of internally displaced people.  
From 2014 to 2016, hundreds of thousands of Syrians reached the borders of Europe 
seeking asylum. During that time and in the preceding two years, the flow of Syrian refugees 
had enough force to challenge European Union structures and solidarity. Only through much 
effort and the sacrifice of European values did it slow by the spring of 2016. The movement 
of Syrians fleeing the effects of war, at first within Syria, then into neighboring countries, 
swept up millions who sought to avoid the fate of the five hundred thousand killed and more 
than a million injured in the most brutal war of the twenty-first century to date. But limited 
opportunities and dwindling resources in the neighboring Arab countries and Turkey 
accelerated the movement toward Europe as refugees who had sought havens in the Middle 
East region found that living conditions had become expensive and unsustainable.3 
The migration of refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic that would challenge the 
European Union’s commitment to the 1951 Geneva Protocol on Refugees occurred in several 
phases. Internal displacement came first, as growing numbers of people sought respite from 
the effects of regime reprisals against activists and their urban strongholds and continued as 
the war developed into a multiparty sectarian conflict with interventions from outside parties 
that resulted in large-scale territorial fragmentation of the country. The second phase of the 
migration, which accounted eventually for four to five million refugees, consisted of legal but 
difficult migration to neighboring countries throughout 2014 when Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Egypt effectively closed their borders.4 In camps and urban areas, Syrians sought to rebuild 
their lives with international aid and by resettling into more stable economies than Syria’s but 
with little success. Weak economies, host society exploitation of vulnerable displaced labor, 
and lack of formal protections by international law prevailed against the refugees. Refuge in 
Turkey, with a “temporary guest” status, which does not meet the Geneva protocol standards, 
allowed a Syrian community to take root in Turkey’s economy without formal residency or 
labor permits, and with the added obstacle of a language difference. But for hundreds of 
thousands of Syrians, Turkey became a route to Europe. The open-door policy of Angela 
Merkel’s Germany and other liberal asylum regimes, particularly in Sweden, drew Syrians 
north, especially after 2013. By spring 2105, an Aegean migratory route from the western 
coast of Turkey to the easternmost Greek islands eclipsed the North African Central 
Mediterranean smuggling route from North Africa to Italy. More than half a million people 
had traversed the Aegean and the Balkan corridor by the winter of 2015. 
 
Internally Displaced Persons in Syria 
By the summer of 2011, casualties in Syrian cities had mounted. In addition to the usual 
disappearance of antigovernment activists, protesters were being shot openly in the street, and 
civilians, particularly young men, were subject to roundups from which they might or might 
not return to their homes. The rapid and indiscriminate escalation of regime violence in areas 
whose populations leaned toward the opposition and harbored Free Syrian Army elements 
made life precarious for all civilians. Mortar and aerial attacks on hospitals, marketplaces, 
and even schools were documented as early as 2012. For many Syrians, displacement began 
when they left their homes and made a temporary move to another, safer neighborhood where 
they found shelter with family members or on the properties of relatives and friends. The 
number of internally displaced persons is hard to estimate because by definition they remain 
within the confines of the war-torn country with limited access to humanitarian and 
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international aid agencies. It is estimated, however, that between seven and eight million 
Syrians are internally displaced. As research shows, internal displacement is extremely 
disruptive to people’s lives. It has serious consequences for their livelihood and income, 
nutritional status and access to food, and access to education and healthcare, and it 
exacerbates the economic devastation that can be expected from war situations.5 Because of 
the extreme conditions created by internal displacement, many displaced persons sought 
longer-term refuge in neighboring countries. 
 
Legal Migration to Neighboring (Arab) Countries 
For millions of Syrians attempting to survive the war, the next step after internal 
displacement was legal migration to neighboring Arab countries. Israel-Palestine and the 
wealthy Persian Gulf Arab countries did not admit Syrian refugees. Because Israel was still at 
war with Syria and effectively controlled the external borders of the Palestinian territories, 
refuge there was unthinkable. The Arab Gulf countries had a long history of labor migration, 
which they controlled by regulating entry and work permission for Syrians and other Arabs. 
These pre-existing barriers to entry, which generally allowed Syrians to travel to and work in 
the Gulf countries only if they came with capital collateral and the sponsorship of Gulf 
citizens or governments, remained in place and effectively blocked any new migration of 
Syrian refugees to their countries. In some instances, Gulf governments and private donors 
contributed financially, but in ways that have been perceived as exacerbating and prolonging 
the war through a patchwork of support to the fragmented and increasingly sectarian Sunni 
Islamic opposition. 
Legal migration to the neighboring countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey and 
to regional Arab countries in North Africa was an immediate response to the lack of security 
and an attempt to establish a more permanent and stable life than one could have as an 
internally displaced person within Syria. In Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria, Syrians 
could escape the fighting and economic stagnation in Syria and apply their professional and 
trade skills and their Arabic language skills to education and employment. As one informant 
reported, in 2011 and 2012, going to Egypt was like going from one province in Syria to 
another—no visa was necessary and the passport check was perfunctory. Middle-class 
Syrians sought to pick up the professions or businesses or education they had had to abandon 
in Syria, and poor Syrians could expect to receive international assistance in refugee camps 
just across the borders.  
Life in the neighboring Arab countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt and 
elsewhere in North Africa, however, was difficult for the displaced Syrians. With about one 
in four of the newcomers residing in camps, registered with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other aid organizations, and receiving forms of international 
assistance, especially food, shelter, and medical care, the camps were soon overcrowded and 
the infrastructure increasingly challenged as the host populations blamed Syrian refugees for 
the exacerbation of pre-existing economic problems. For example, the rapidly growing 
Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, located in a place where there had been no previous 
habitation, became the fourth largest population center in the kingdom with dangerous 
consequences for the country’s infrastructure and water system in particular. In Lebanon’s 
refugee camps, aid workers were hard-pressed to provide adequate food, shelter, and clothing 
for the growing numbers of refugees who had assembled by 2013. 
Life in cities was better for those with some resources, though it was fraught with great 
difficulties as well.6 The movement of Syrians into cities such as Amman, Jordan, and 
Tripoli, Lebanon, squeezed their economies.7 Rent soared while wages dropped and already 
high levels of unemployment among the local population escalated as Syrians entered the 
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countries desperate for work. Infrastructure, especially water and waste systems, were 
stressed.8 The three-quarters of Syrian refugees trying to make new lives in the cities faced 
many obstacles, including the bureaucracy involved in obtaining residency permits, housing 
shortages that resulted in families camping in open commercial properties or living in the 
streets, and, for those lucky enough to get a job, difficult working conditions, such as the 
expectation that they work twelve-to-fourteen-hour shifts for much less than nonrefugee local 
workers would accept. What little food aid reached Syrians who registered with the United 
Nations and other charitable organizations dwindled away as NGOs budgets disappeared and 
their caseloads grew. By 2013, seeing graft and corruption among NGOs, refugees had grown 
cynical about their role in the economy. Hundreds of thousands of Syrian students were 
unable to complete their schooling because already overcrowded local schools would not 
accept them. Also, the few schools run by the Syrian Opposition Coalition that were funded 
by donations from Gulf and North African countries were overcrowded. Their administration 
was expensive and corrupt, adding to instability and trauma pupils and their families were 
experiencing. 
By 2014, Jordan was hosting more than half a million Syrians, and Lebanon more than a 
million, which made up a quarter of the country’s population. Another hundred thousand, all 
of whom were Shiites, Kurds, or Bedouins, sought shelter in Iraq. During the summer of 
2013, those who had fled to Egypt were suddenly unwelcome when the Muslim Brotherhood 
government of Mohamed Morsi, which had been sympathetic to Syrians, fell. Under the 
regime of General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, Syrians, often seen as supportive of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, became the targets of hostility and suspicion. Consequently, Syrians in Egypt 
considered heading across the Mediterranean to Europe. 
Also by 2014, as many as three million Syrians were living in the neighboring Arab 
countries. Their circumstances varied from the squalor of the refugee camp and a barely 
sustainable lifestyle in the cities to the more acceptable circumstances in which members of 
the upper middle classes and professional classes were able to live. Most Syrians found life in 
the neighboring Arab countries to be little better than life in their own war-torn country. They 
were more assured of security of life than they had been in Syria, but they were not yet 
assured of security of shelter, livelihood, and education.9 
 
Syrian Refugees in Turkey 
Northern Syrians had been crossing back and forth across the Turkey-Syrian border since 
about 2009, when relations between the Turkish AK Party and the pre-revolt regime of 
Bashar Assad had been warm and cooperative. Thus, when the war reached into the northern 
parts of the country, many Syrians headed to the Turkish border for safety. Despite the 
language barrier for the vast majority of Syrians, Turkey would ultimately host up to three 
million Syrian refugees. Turkey’s population of eighty million and its relatively prosperous 
economy (with the world’s seventeenth largest GDP) would accommodate more Syrians than 
any other country in the region. Though the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey was double 
the number in Lebanon, Syrians residing in Turkey constituted only 3 percent of the 
population. Syrian quarters grew rapidly in the southern cities of Turkey, while 
neighborhoods such as Basmane in Izmir and the Fatih quarter of Istanbul were visibly 
transformed by the newcomers. Istanbul’s Aksaray, with its Syrian grocery stores and 
numerous Syrian restaurants, became known as “Little Syria.”10 
By 2013, when the war in Syria spread to Aleppo and Damascus and the war between 
ISIS/Daesh and Syria’s northern Kurds had culminated in the siege and destruction of 
Kobani, ever greater numbers of Syrians fled to Turkey to start new lives. By 2014, the 
number of Syrian Arabs and Kurds living and working in Turkey’s cities outnumbered those 
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living in the refugee camps on the border by a ratio of at least four to one. But Turkey did not 
consider Syrian refugees to be asylum seekers nor did it grant them refugee status under the 
1951 Geneva Conventions. Instead they were seen as temporary guests of indeterminate 
status. Many Syrians preferred to float freely in the Turkish economy and feared being 
registered and possibly confined to refugee camps.  
Two more factors accelerated the number of Syrians entering Turkey before the borders 
closed during the first days of 2016. With the closure of the Egyptian, Lebanese, and 
Jordanian borders during 2013 and 2014, new asylum seekers could choose to go only to 
Turkey. Also, large numbers of Syrian refugees who had fled initially to neighboring Arab 
countries were burning through their savings and had few prospects for living sustainably in 
Jordan and Lebanon. As the disenchantment with the prospect of life in neighboring Arab 
countries grew stronger in 2013 and 2014, more and more people began to consider illegal 
migration to Europe. The Central Mediterranean route was long, dangerous, and difficult to 
access from Sisi’s Egypt. Consequently, the comparatively shorter and presumably safer 
Aegean route from Turkey’s western coast to the islands of Greece became much more 
popular. 
 
Seeking Refuge in Europe 
By 2014, Syrian refugees were making their way to the Mediterranean coast of Tunisia, 
Libya, and Egypt to join boatloads of North and sub-Saharan Africans making their way to 
Europe. Liberal asylum policies and welfare states attracted those for whom life in Syria was 
intolerable, in neighboring Arab countries unsustainable, and in Turkey unintelligible. 
German chancellor Angela Merkel’s welcoming rhetoric and reliably punctual German 
asylum hearings and family reunification policy were added incentives to head to Germany. 
Under the European Union’s Schengen agreement and in the spirit of free movement within 
Europe, Europe’s southern border gave easier access to the German and Scandinavian 
welfare states.11 
The migration route that would come to be known as the Central Mediterranean route 
involved large decommissioned cargo ships departing from Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt run by 
smuggling gangs. Initially, the cost for an individual to gain passage on one of the “ghost 
ships” started at about three thousand euros. Syrians who were able to collect that sum and 
who reached North Africa found it easy to make contact with smugglers’ representatives 
through networks of friends and acquaintances.12 Many of these smuggling representatives 
and recruiters were themselves Syrian refugees working for local Egyptian or Libyan gangs 
who knew how to acquire cargo boats and bribe local officials, coast guard patrols, and 
police. Throughout 2014, the boats that made the weeklong journey from the African coast to 
Italy had a greater percentage of Syrians among their passengers. Passengers would put their 
money in escrow with third parties, relatives, or “insurance agencies” proposed by their 
smugglers. They would be collected in the dozens of isolated rural villas near the coast to 
await their unknown departure date. Then they would be crammed together on buses to drive 
up and down the coastal highways until they were able to make a nighttime rendezvous with 
a ghost ship just over the horizon. These bus rides foreshadowed the journey to come. 
Overcrowded, cramped, and increasingly subject to the threats and shouted orders of the 
smugglers’ men, the passengers would wrap their papers and money in cellophane to prepare 
for the sea voyage, unwrapping them and hiding their life vests when stopped unexpectedly 
by police patrols. The bus journeys up and down the coast were designed to elude police and 
border control and allow the refugees to embark at points where such authorities were not 
present or had been bribed not to appear. During the week-long journey, passengers lost 
contact with their families and friends because the only telephone on board would be the 
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smugglers’ Thuraya satellite phone. According to reports, Syrian passengers who paid 
thousands of euros were crowded onto the top deck of the ship, while African passengers 
were held below deck in an ugly race-based hierarchy. Starting in 2014, the number of deaths 
and accidents on these ghost ships began to rise dramatically, to the point where the European 
search-and-rescue NGO Mare Nostrum was unable to cope. Even the European frontier 
police Frontex was unable to secure the Southern European shoreline and international 
waters. 
By 2015, many Syrian refugees began looking to Turkey as an alternate launching point 
for the trip to Europe. In contrast to the Central Mediterranean route, which involved large 
numbers of people (usually in the hundreds) boarding ghost ships for up to a week at sea, the 
Aegean route seemed to promise an easier sea journey in which refugees and migrants might 
hope to have more autonomy and control. The trip between the Turkish coast and the 
easternmost Greek island of Lesbos was short—in the best conditions, the voyage between 
Dikili in Izmir Province and the Lesbian capital of Mytilini could take as little as half an 
hour. The craft of choice became the small inflatable pontoon boat, and usually for much of 
the journey migrants were able to maintain contact with the outside world by cell phone 
rather than being dependent on their smugglers. On most trips, the migrants were not piloted 
or guided but left to their own fate on badly overcrowded and underfueled rafts with no crew. 
The short crossing could last for hours. 
As the numbers of Syrian refugees on the Aegean route grew, the refugees were joined 
by a growing train of migrants from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, and 
Lebanon. The Aegean trip soon became as perilous as the longer Central Mediterranean route 
that it supplanted. Smugglers who recruited their passengers in and around the cafés of 
Basmane Square in Izmir were working with a ruthless business model. The Aegean crossing 
cost each passenger initially two thousand dollars (half price for children).13 At this rate, 
several times what it would have cost to fly safely from Turkey to the European Union, the 
small inflatable rafts were packed and overcrowded, making their passenger loads unsafe. 
Passengers crammed together and sitting on top of one another caused the boats to ride very 
low on the choppy waters of the Aegean Sea. To avoid consequences for the owners and 
crews of the vessels, the inflatable rafts were not staffed with crews. Usually the smugglers, 
after loading and overloading people on to the boat, would randomly assign one of the 
passengers, most often someone with no previous experience on the water, to man the 
outboard motor. The motors were used and recycled for maximum profit, and the boats 
loaded with only enough fuel to bring their terrified passengers almost, but not all of the way, 
to the Greek coast. Because most of the migrants did not know how to swim and were 
burdened with personal possessions, including cheap knock-off life vests and other makeshift 
personal safety devices, as many as six to twelve people a day died on the short crossing.  
The rafts and boats that embarked at night from secret locations along the Turkish coast 
tried to avoid the Turkish and Greek coast guards. Sometimes the migrants who hoped to 
reach the Greek coast had to be rescued by one of the coast guards, and sometimes they were 
intercepted by a Turkish or Greek coast guard cutter and returned to Izmir, where they would 
try again and again as long as their funds and spirits held out. There are numerous accounts, 
however, of pilots of power boats claiming to be either the Turkish or especially the Greek 
coast guard who attempted to disable and strand many of the refugee boats by stealing their 
outboard motors, puncturing the boat with sharp sticks, or trying to capsize the boats. During 
2015, despite the perils of the Aegean route, this avenue overtook the Central Mediterranean 
route with hundreds of thousands Syrian migrants and others crossing by March 2016, when 
the route was effectively blocked by the EU-Turkish deal described in the next section. 
Despite of the increasing number of drownings, hundreds of thousands of Syrians and 
others took the refugee path to reach EU territory in Greece. Fresh from its own financial 
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nightmare, Europe’s most embattled economy and government was in no position to manage 
its own affairs, let alone those of thousands of desperate newcomers. Reception centers on the 
Greek islands descended into chaos despite the best efforts of many local and international 
volunteers and NGOs. Nevertheless, throughout 2015, most refugees were processed and sent 
by ferry to Athens to begin a journey by buses, taxis, and trains and on foot that would take 
them through the Balkans to their final destinations in Central or Northern Europe. 
At first, Serbia, Hungary, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia regularly 
intercepted groups of undocumented Syrians and other migrants and sent them back to the 
country from which they had most recently come. But by the end of 2015, the practice at 
borders and transit countries was to push migrants toward rather than away from their 
destination to avoid their repeated attempts to cross each country. Migrants avoided Bulgaria 
and Romania, which were perceived to be hostile to Muslim asylum seekers and where 
refugees were routinely subjected to unlawful detention and bodily harm.14 The westernmost 
route through Albania, Bosnia, and Montenegro was perceived as difficult because of 
challenging geographical features such as mountains and because the former Yugoslav 
republics and Albania were themselves the source of migrants and asylum seekers on their 
way to Western Europe. The principal migration route ran from Greece and the Republic of 
Macedonia through Serbia and into Hungary, the frontier member of the European Union and 
the Schengen agreement. During the fall of 2015, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban 
began narrowing the corridor by building a fence at the border between his country and 
Serbia and launching a campaign, with clear xenophobic undercurrents, to discourage 
migrants from entering. The effect of the blockage was to shift the route west from the 
Hungarian border to the Croatian border with Serbia, opening up a new route through Croatia 
and Slovenia into Austria and Germany. Depending on their resources and budgets, migrants 
could make their way to Austria and Germany by bus, train, or taxi. The many whose funds 
ran out were at the mercy of strangers and governments along their route. 
Following in the example of Hungary, first Denmark and then other governments across 
Europe began to push back against the flow of migrants. Resistance to the migrants had 
peaked with the Paris attacks of November 2015 in which ISIS fighters killed 130 Parisians 
while using planted or forged Syrian passports at the site of the atrocities. Public opinion, 
including in the prime destinations of Sweden and Germany, began to sour. Wherever de 
facto migrant camps sprang up in Europe, volunteers stepped forward to help the travelers 
while others grumbled about the cost to their societies and welfare states. Xenophobic 
sentiments mounted.  
In February 2016, the system began to break down.15 When Austria closed its border, 
claiming that it would not become “a waiting room for Germany,” Slovenia and Croatia did 
the same, refusing to be waiting rooms for Austria. Ultimately the countries of Eastern 
Europe, acting formally or informally through the Visegrád Association, agreed to fortify the 
Greek-Macedonian border, which was effectively closed during the last week of February 
2016. It remains closed as of this writing. Fourteen thousand people camped out in the field at 
the Greek village of Idomeni on the Greek side of the Macedonian border as European 
leaders negotiated with Turkey for a return of migrants across the Aegean. The squalid de 
facto refugee camp at Idomeni temporarily replaced the “jungle” at Calais as Europe’s largest 
favela. More than half of these late arrivals were women and children seeking to join 
husbands and fathers who had already arrived in Germany. They lived in tents swamped in 
mud, existing on handouts from various NGOs and the overwhelmed Greek state. While the 
camp at Idomeni was emptied in 2017, thousands of Syrians remain precariously sheltered in 
Greece, hoping to be granted asylum in the European Union and fearing that they might be 
returned to Turkey. 
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Political Challenges in the European Union 
The challenge to European solidarity and principles took the form of a deal proposed by 
Turkey’s AK Party to the European Union in March 2016 that was ratified shortly thereafter 
by the member states of the European Union. According to the provisions of the deal, Turkey 
would readmit illegal migrants to Greece who arrived after March 20, 2016. In return, the 
European Union would provide an additional three billion euros to help Turkey meet the 
needs of the migrants. For every “illegal asylum seeker” returned to Turkey, one vetted by 
through the Turkish camp system would be sent to a European asylum from a refugee camp. 
Migrants and refugees and NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
Save the Children, and Doctors Without Borders, objected to the deal on several counts. It 
seemed to provide for collective returns of migrants without new hearings for those seeking 
asylum. More important, Turkey was considered unsafe because non-European migrants 
returned to Turkey would not enjoy the protection of the 1951 Geneva Protocol on the Status 
of Refugees and its provision against nonrefoulement or repatriation to the country of danger. 
Some migrants, especially the non-Syrians most likely to be traded to Turkey, risked being 
sent back to their countries without fair hearings in Turkey. Others, particularly Kurds, were 
vulnerable to persecution in Turkey. Several NGOs briefly stopped providing services to 
Greek refugee camps on the grounds that they were no longer refugee camps but detention 
and deportation camps. 
By April 2016, new arrivals to the Greek islands from Turkey dwindled to a trickle of 
fewer than a hundred a day. At the same time, shipwrecks on the Central Mediterranean route 
from Libya or Egypt to Italy may have claimed the lives of several hundred people as the 
Central Mediterranean smuggling route geared up again. As many as fifty-two thousand 
asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants who had been confined in Greece since mid-February 
2016 continued to languish, feeling themselves forgotten. According to Human Rights 
Watch, the first deportations of Afghans, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis began to take place. 
Greek police assisted by auxiliaries from Frontex accompanied handcuffed migrants back to 
undisclosed locations in Turkey. Preliminary reports suggest that deportees not only were not 
given fair hearings but were deprived of their personal effects, including money, papers, and 
cell phones, and were given no advance notification of their situation.16 Between 2016 and 
2018 tens of thousands of educated Syrians who could be presumed to be grateful and loyal 
to the government and party of Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were granted 
Turkish citizenship, fueling anti-Syrian sentiments in many parts of Turkish society 
By the time Syrian people arrived in large numbers on the southern shores of Europe, 
they had already endured much trauma and had made critical decisions that limited their 
ability to return to Syria or even to neighboring Arab countries. By investing their finite 
resources in a desperate venture to a European system that had become ever more fragile, 
hostile, and divided, they opened a wedge that many other migrants and survival refugees 
took advantage of. Though the number of Syrians reaching Europe is lower than the number 
in neighboring countries, Syrian migrants have a forward momentum and investment in the 
ideals of European asylum that threatens the integrity and solidarity of the European project. 
The stress on Europe is not of its being overwhelmed with Muslims of different culture and 
values but that the claims of European universalism are being tested. 
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